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Because of the significant investment in the mandatory price reporting program (MPR) 
by the USDA and by packers, it is important to understand what producers believe about 
its effectiveness.   This study reports results from a survey of feedyards located primarily 
in Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, and Iowa.  Results indicate a diversity of opinion regarding 
MPR effectiveness.  On average producers are neutral to negative regarding the value of 
MPR to them.  Interestingly, feedlot characteristics appear to have little systematic 
relationship to the manager’s perceptions regarding the usefulness of MPR.        
 




In April of 2001 the USDA implemented the Livestock Mandatory Price 
Reporting Act of 1999.  This act requires packers who slaughter 125,000 head of cattle 
per year to report to USDA, twice daily, every purchase and sale of livestock and boxed 
beef.  Mandatory Price Reporting (MPR) is an expensive endeavor.  Preliminary industry 
estimates were that compliance would cost beef packers $7,420 per plant annually and 
the Agricultural Marketing Service nearly $6 million in 2001 alone.  MPR is a new 
program that has undergone and will continue to undergo scrutiny by the beef industry, 
USDA, and policy makers.  Therefore, it is essential to determine its usefulness.  Is 
mandatory price reporting of fed cattle working?  Have beef producers benefited from 
MPR?  Have benefits been similar across cattle feeders having different characteristics?  
These questions must be addressed to assess net benefits of MPR.  The central objective 
of this research is to answer these questions.  This will help establish how successful the 
MPR program has been and how satisfied feedlots are with MPR as compared to the 
previously used voluntary price reporting system.  In addition, we estimate how particular 
characteristics of a feedlot affect feedlot manager attitudes regarding MPR.   
 
Since it is a new program, quantifiable research on the effectiveness of MPR has 
not been done.  However, the USDA is scheduled to complete a comprehensive review of 
the effectiveness of MPR in 2003.  Thus, information regarding perceptions of one of its 
primary intended beneficiaries, cattle feedlots, is timely.  From the first day of 
implementation, individuals involved in the day-to-day maintenance of the program dealt 
with a multitude of problems including compatibility between USDA and packer 
computer hardware and software, sparse price reporting because of a confidentiality 
clause used in implementation of price reports, an error in computer code used to 
calculate boxed beef cutout values, and numerous other issues.  Accompanying these 
problems, there have been numerous concerns voiced by different players in the market 
about the effectiveness of MPR (e.g., Cattle Buyers Weekly).  This study reports results 
from a survey of cattle feedlot managers to determine their perspectives and attitudes 
regarding the effectiveness of mandatory price reporting.    




A voluntary livestock price reporting system has been in place at the USDA 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) since 1946.  But, many participants in the 
industry believed that the changes in the market in recent years rendered the voluntary 
system ineffective.  Congress passed the MPR in large part because of pressure from 
producer organizations that were concerned increased formula sales and marketing 
agreements between feedlots and beef packers had made voluntarily reported price 
information sparse and not representative of beef and cattle market conditions.  For 
example, in the early 1990s approximately 10% of daily local fed cattle cash market price 
reports in Kansas and Texas were not reported because of insufficient trading volume.  
By 2000 this had increased to nearly 60%.  Many producers were also concerned that 
certain feedlots were getting special deals with packers that were not available to others 
(i.e., they were concerned that price discrimination was present) and that were not 
reflected in daily USDA-AMS market news reports.  Producers wanted more spot market 
price information, prices and quality premiums and discounts for noncash fed cattle sales, 
volumes of contract, formula, and packer feeding deliveries, increased boxed beef price 
information, and export sales data reported to help them negotiate terms of trade.  They 
were demanding more transparency for cattle and beef sales transactions.  MPR was 
implemented to address these concerns.   
 
The act requires packers to report prices paid for each animal purchased and the 
terms of each transaction.  These reports are released twice daily and weekly summaries 
are also reported for several local and regional fed cattle markets.  In addition, increased 
details on boxed beef prices and movement are reported   
 
From the start, MPR faced many challenges.  First, proponents had quite high 
expectations of what MPR was going to accomplish.  Some felt MPR would cause fed 
cattle prices to be noticeably higher as fed cattle sales negotiating leverage became more 
favorable to cattle feeders as a result of more price information availability.  Others 
anticipated the so called “sweetheart deals” certain feedlots were thought to be enjoying 
would be revealed.  Opponents cited excessive costs of implementation and suggested 
that in the end these increased costs would actually reduce fed cattle prices.  Originally, 
MPR was to begin in January 2001.  Numerous unanticipated problems with collecting 
and summarizing transaction information from packers delayed inception until April 
2001.   
 
Shortly after being launched, critics of MPR abounded including both original 
opponents as well as many that had aggressively lobbied for MPR.  Initially, a 
confidentiality clause in reporting resulted in many daily reports being non-reported.    
This problem was so severe that in August 2001, five months after inception, USDA 
substantially modified this clause.  Between April 2, 2001 and August 17, 2001, before 
the confidentiality clause was modified, 81% of the regional and national daily afternoon 
direct slaughter negotiated purchase prices were not reported because of the 
confidentiality clause.  After modification of the confidentiality clause none of the 4 
regional and national daily afternoon direct slaughter negotiated purchase reports 
between August 20, 2001 and April 2, 2002 were not reported because of confidentiality.   
 
A further challenge facing MPR was a calculation error in boxed beef price 
reporting that resulted in approximately the first six weeks of boxed beef prices being 
under-reported.  This error raised serious concerns among industry participants regarding 
the integrity of a reporting system that already had skeptics.  Perhaps the strongest 
concern among early proponents was that expectations of what MPR would do to 
contribute to increasing cattle feeder leverage in price discovery and negotiating terms of 
trade did not occur.  Essentially, little “new” information that was not already reported 
under the voluntary system was revealed. 
 
Empirical Model and Procedures 
 
A major objective of this paper is to determine cattle feeder opinions regarding 
mandatory price reporting and to quantify how feedlot characteristics influence a feedlot 
manager’s level of agreement with the following statements:  1) Mandatory price 
reporting is benefiting the industry, 2) Information on regional/national daily fed cattle 
cash prices, base prices used in grid pricing, premiums/discounts using in grid pricing, 
and boxed beef prices has increased, and 3) MPR has enhanced my ability to negotiate 
cash prices, base prices or formulas, grid premiums/discounts with packers.  As 
discussed later, a survey was conducted to answer these questions.   
 
Responses to these statements were queried using a scale of 1 through 9, with 1 
strongly disagree, 5 uncertain or no opinion, to 9 strongly agree.  Feedlot characteristics 
and concerns about the cattle marketing environment by feedlot managers were used as 
explanatory variables to summarize how perceptions varied across feedlots.    Because 
feedlot manager perceptions of MPR ( i Y ) range between 1 and 9 they are doubly 
censored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 9 (strongly agree).  An empirical representation of 
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where  i X is a vector of explanatory variables used to describe feedlot manager i’s 
perceptions, â is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and e is a random error assumed 
normally distributed with a zero mean and constant variance. 
  
The expected value of all observations of a dependent variable whose distribution is 
censored from below at L and from above by U is given by (Greene) 
 5 
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where  ()/,()/,(.) LU zLXzUX bsbsf =-=-  is the unit normal density, and  (.) F is 
the cumulative normal distribution function.  The effect of a change in the kth variable on 
expected Y is 
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where ()() UL zz F-F  represents the probability of observing a noncensored observation. 
 
The following Tobit models were estimated to determine how various feedlot 
characteristics and feedlot manager concerns are related to feedlot attitudes toward MPR 
(subscript i is dropped for notational convenience). 
   
(2)  BENEFIT = â0 + â1REGION1 + â2REGION2 + â3REGION3 + â4CFED + 
â5MOST + â6CASHMKT + â7HEADMKTD + â8OPINION1 + â9OPINION2 + 
â10OPINION3 + â11OPINION4+ e 
   
(3)  INFO = â0 + â1REGION1 + â2REGION2 + â3REGION3 + â4CFED + â5MOST + 
â6CASHMKT + â7HEADMKTD + â8OPINION1 + â9OPINION2 + â10OPINION3 
+ â11OPINION4+ e 
 
(3)  NEGOTIATE = â0 + â1REGION1 + â2REGION2 + â3REGION3 + â4CFED + 
â5MOST + â6CASHMKT + â7HEADMKTD + â8OPINION1 + â9OPINION2 + 
â10OPINION3 + â11OPINION4+ e 
   
where all variables are defined in Table 1.  The particular factors included in the models 
are those that were hypothesized to have differing relations to perceptions regarding MPR 
across feedlots and feedlot managers.  First, perceptions regarding MPR were allowed to 
differ depending upon where feedlots were located (REGIONk).  Regional differences 
could occur in places for example where voluntary price reporting had become 
particularly thin during most days of the week such as Kansas or Texas relative to 
Nebraska.  Marketing methods used by the feedlot might also affect manager perceptions 
and attitudes about MPR.  The percentage of cattle being custom fed (CFED) relative to 
those owned by the feedlot might be related to the feedlot’s aggressiveness and demand 
for price and market information when selling cattle.   The percentage of fed cattle 
marketed that were sold to the buyer that purchased the most cattle from the firm (MOST) 
was included to reflect  the number of packers that regularly buy cattle from the feeder 
which could  influence how much market information a feedlot manager needs from 
MPR reports.  Whether a feedlot tends to market more cattle in the cash market 
(CASHMKT) where daily price negotiation may be critical was also expected to be 
related to how a feedlot manager perceived MPR.  Those operating in the cash market 
may need timely daily price information more than those selling on formulas. Feedlot 
size (HEADMKTD) might influence MPR perceptions.  Larger feedlots may have 6 
information networks more fully developed and may be relying more on other sources of 
market information relative to smaller yards.   
 
Several questions were asked of the feedyard managers regarding marketing 
methods and packer competition.  These issues were intended to categorize the manager 
according to how they view the market that they operate in to determine whether these 
factors influence their perceptions about MPR.  Many feel that packers reduce bids when 
packers contract cattle purchases.  Such producers are ones that might want more 
information than MPR was intended to provide.  Therefore, we included the feedlot 
manager’s level of concern about whether contracting reduced prices as an explanatory 
variable (OPINION1).  Similar variables were included for feeder concern about packer 
concentration (OPINION2), banning packer cattle feeding (OPINION3), and banning 




In August 2001, in conjunction with Beef magazine, a survey was mailed to 
approximately 2,780 feedlots located throughout the U.S.  These yards represented all 
feedlots with over 4,000 head one-time capacity and a sample of smaller yards.  Only 91 
feedlots returned useable surveys despite a follow-up letter.  The response rate was too 
low (about 3%) to have any confidence in the results or generalizations derived from 
them.  Therefore, a second survey was conducted in March 2002 of cattle feedlots in 
Kansas, Iowa, Texas, and Nebraska by economists from each of the individual states.
1  
The revised survey was shortened and simplified and it was hoped that this, together with 
sending the surveys from each respective state’s (or neighboring state) land grant 
university would improve response rates.  Overall, 1500 feedlots were surveyed and 316 
feedlots returned useable responses.  Response rates by state were 152/970 in Iowa 
(16%), 50/131 in Kansas (38%), 66/250 in Nebraska (26%), and 48/148 in Texas (32%).  
The resurvey increased the response rate to 20%.   
 
The questionnaire asked for feedback on MPR report usage, and whether the new 
reports have enhanced feedlot negotiations with packers for base prices, quality 
premiums and discounts, and cash prices.  The questionnaire also queried information on 
where the operation is located, who owns the animals, how prices are negotiated, and 
what marketing arrangements are used.  Opinion questions were answered using a scale 
of 1 through 9, with 1 strongly disagree, 5 uncertain or no opinion, to 9 strongly agree.    
 
Summary statistics of data used in the empirical models are contained in table 1.  
The average feedlot respondent marketed approximately
2 18,500 head in 2001 however, 
the standard deviation was over 38,000 head.  The respondents included large yards as 
well as many smaller yards (54% of the feedlots respondents marketed less than 2,500 
                                                 
1 Surveys administration and collection amongst the various states were:  Iowa, John Lawrence; Kansas, 
Ted Schroeder; Nebraska, Dillon Feuz; and Texas, Clement Ward. 
2 Survey responses were categorical but were converted to continuous values.  Less than 5,000=2,500; 
5,000 to 19,999=5,000; 20,000 to 49,999=20,000; 50,000 to 99,999=50,000; 100,000 to 249,999=100,000; 
250,000 or more=250,000.   7 
head).  The typical feedyard respondent was using a marketing agreement that was not 
part of an alliance for 26% of their fed cattle marketings, 26% were part of an alliance, 
and 48% were using no marketing agreement (figure 1).  On average, feed yards were 
pricing 55% of their fed cattle marketings using cash market live weight or carcass 
weight prices, 44% using grid pricing, 1% using a fixed price forward contract, 0.6% 
using a basis price forward contract, and 0.07% using some other pricing method (figure 
2).         
 
On average feedlot managers were somewhat indifferent about whether MPR had 
benefited the beef industry with an average response of 4.29.  However, as shown in 
figure 3, there was a wide disparity of opinions, with the most popular being strong 
disagreement (22%) and neutral (22%).  The average feed yard respondent did not 
believe MPR had increased information availability (figure 4).  In fact, 58% of producers 
responded with a 4 or lower score indicating moderate to strong disagreement that MPR 
had increased price information.  Finally, reflective of the fact that producers may have 
now realized that MPR is not going to enhance their ability to negotiate terms of trade 
with packers, some 71% indicated a score of 4 or lower in response to whether it had 
(figure 5). 
 
Figure 1.  Average Percentage of Fed Cattle Marketed by Feedlots Owned or Managed 



























































MA 1:  Marketing agreement or contract (not part of an alliance, cooperative, or similar 
marketing program)
MA 2:  Marketing agreement or contract (part of an alliance, cooperative, or similar marketing 
program)
No MA:  Not under a marketing agreement or contract and not part of an alliance, 
cooperative, or similar marketing program)8 
Figure 2.  Average Fed Cattle Marketed by Feedlots Owned or Managed (Excluding 





















Table 1.  Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables     
BENEFIT  Response to “Mandatory price reporting is 
benefiting the beef industry” (1= strongly 
disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
4.29  2.58 
INFO  Average of response to “Information on 
regional/national daily fed cattle cash prices, 
base prices used in grid pricing, 
premiums/discounts using in grid pricing, 
boxed beef prices has increased”  (1= strongly 
disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
3.90  1.96 
NEGOTIATE  Average of response to “MPR has enhanced 
my ability to negotiate cash prices, base prices 
or formulas, grid premiums/discounts with 
packers” (1= strongly disagree to 9=strongly 
agree) 
2.97  1.97 
 
Independent Variables 
   
REGION1  1 if majority of firm’s feedlots are in Nebraska, 
0 otherwise 
0.25  0.43 
REGION2  1 if majority of firm’s feedlots are in Kansas,  
0 otherwise 
0.15  0.36 











































































































































































































































































































































































































2  1 if majority of firm’s feedlots are in Iowa or 
any other state, 0 otherwise (Default Region) 
0.37  0.49 
CFED  Percent of cattle in yard custom fed in 2001 
(%) 
35.32  37.76 
MOST  Percent of cattle sold to buyer that purchased 
the most cattle from the firm in 2001 (%) 
68.98  24.18 
CASHMKT  Percent of cattle priced using cash market, (live 
weight and carcass weight, excluding packer-
owned) in 2001 (%) 
54.67  37.83 
HEADMKTD  Total number of fed cattle marketed by the firm 
in 2001 (thousand head) 
18.54  38.08 
OPINION1  Response to  ”Cash market bids by packers are 
lower when packers have cattle contracted” (1= 
strongly disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
7.68  2.09 
OPINION2  Response to “The largest packers should be 
broken into several smaller packers” (1= 
strongly disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
4.88  2.54 
OPINION3  Response to “Packers should not be permitted 
to own and feed cattle” (1= strongly disagree to 
9=strongly agree)   
6.63  2.88 
OPINION4  Response to “Packers should not be permitted 
to contract or form marketing agreements with 
feeders and cattle owners” (1= strongly 
disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
4.76  2.75 
2 Iowa accounts for 79% 
       
Tobit Estimation Results 
 
To determine how various feedlot characteristics and manager concerns about the fed 
cattle market were related to opinions regarding the effectiveness of mandatory price 
reporting, Tobit models were used to estimate equations (2)-(4).   Two-limit Tobit 
parameter estimates of factors affecting cattle feeder perceptions of mandatory price 
reporting are summarized in tables 2-4.  The first question analyzed was whether MPR 
was benefiting the beef industry (table 2).  Producers were split in their opinion regarding 
the statement with about 9% being at the upper limit of strongly agreeing (BENEFIT=9) 
and 22% at the lower limit of strongly disagreeing (BENEFIT=1).  Very few of the 
coefficient estimates were statistically different from zero at conventional levels of 
significance.  The strongest indicators of a manager’s perception of how beneficial MPR 
was to the beef industry was associated with whether the manager thought large packers 
should be broken into smaller packers (0.06 significance level), packers should be 
allowed to feed cattle (0.11 significance level), and/or packers should be involved in 
marketing agreements (0.03 significance level).  The more strongly against packers 
owning cattle (OPINION3) or contracting (OPINION4), the more the manager was 
inclined to agree that MPR was beneficial.   Therefore, those with stronger held opinions 
wanting to ban beef packers from vertically integrating or forming marketing agreements 10 
with cattle feeders are more likely to feel the industry is benefiting from MPR.  Also, the 
more strongly in favor of breaking up large packers (OPINION2), the more likely the 
feedlot manager was to agree that MPR was benefiting the beef industry. 
Whether cattle feeders thought information on fed cattle cash prices, base prices, and 
grid premiums and discounts, and boxed beef prices had increased in the presence of 
MPR had some similar and contrasting results (table 3).  First, feeders located primarily 
in Texas (REGION3) were less likely to indicate price information had improved.  Also, 
those producers that felt most strongly that captive supplies depress cash market prices 
(OPINION1) were less likely to indicate that price information had increased in the 
presence of MPR.   
Many cattle feeders felt strongly that MPR had not enhanced their ability to negotiate 
terms of trade with packers.  In fact, 38% indicated that they very strongly disagreed that 
MPR had helped them in negotiations with beef packers (table 4).  The total number of 
fed cattle marketed by the firm is the only statistically significant variable related to 
manager’s perceptions of whether ability to negotiate with packers had increased.  As 
marketings increase the feedlot manager is less likely to agree that MPR has improved 
their ability to negotiate.  There are two factors that are marginally statistically 
significantly.  The first was sentiments producers had about packer concentration.  Cattle 
feeders that thought large beef packers should be split up (OPINION2) were more 
inclined to agree (or perhaps more accurately, less inclined to disagree) that MPR had 
enhanced their ability to negotiate terms of trade with packers.  The second marginally 
statistically significant factor referred to regional differences in opinion regarding 
whether MPR had enhanced feedlot’s ability to negotiate with packers.  Cattle feeders 
located primarily in Texas (REGION3) were less likely to agree that ability to negotiate 
had improved compared to those in Iowa.  
 
Table 2.  Two-Limit Tobit Estimates of “Mandatory Price Reporting is Benefiting 











Intercept  3.39529  1.17876  0.0040   
REGION1  -0.2541  0.52967  0.6314  -0.2007 
REGION2  -1.25775  0.74683  0.0922  -0.9933 
REGION3  -0.98842  0.76643  0.1972  -0.7806 
CFED  0.003289  0.0067635  0.6268  0.0026 
MOST  0.004563  0.0086878  0.5994  0.0036 
CASHMKT  0.001682  0.0059343  0.7768  0.0013 
HEADMKTD  -0.00976  0.0066644  0.1431  -0.0077 
OPINION1  -0.12899  0.10927  0.2378  -0.1019 
OPINION2  0.18926  0.10066  0.0601  0.1495 
OPINION3  0.15341  0.09597  0.1100  0.1211 
OPINION4  0.22136  0.09882  0.0251  0.1748 
Log of Likelihood = -604.08  Number of Observations = 284   
Right Censored Observations = 26   s = 3.17     
Left Censored Observations = 61       11 
Table 3.  Two-Limit Tobit Estimates of Average of Response to “Information on 
Regional/National Daily Fed Cattle Cash Prices, Base Prices used in Grid Pricing, 
Premiums/Discounts Used in Grid Pricing, Boxed Beef Prices Has Increased”  (1= 











Intercept  5.86337  0.70123  <.0001   
REGION1  0.26279  0.30971  0.3962  0.2557 
REGION2  0.33489  0.41864  0.4237  0.3259 
REGION3  -0.79844  0.46669  0.0871  -0.7770 
CFED  -0.0013642  0.0038092  0.7202  -0.0013 
MOST  -0.01059  0.0050510  0.0361  -0.0103 
CASHMKT  0.00004875  0.0032966  0.9882  0.0000 
HEADMKTD  -0.0041036  0.0031967  0.1992  -0.0040 
OPINION1  -0.16703  0.07017  0.0173  -0.1625 
OPINION2  0.05938  0.05791  0.3051  0.0578 
OPINION3  0.08341  0.06141  0.1744  0.0812 
OPINION4  0.03333  0.05649  0.5552  0.0324 
Log of Likelihood = -566.94  Number of Observations = 283   
Right Censored Observations = 0  s = 1.95     
Left Censored Observations = 39       
 
Table 4.  Two-Limit Tobit Estimates of Average of Response to “MPR Has 
Enhanced My Ability to Negotiate Cash Prices, Base Prices or Formulas, Grid 











Intercept  2.81821  1.05308  0.0074   
REGION1  0.42721  0.45701  0.3499  0.3318 
REGION2  -0.25646  0.64912  0.6928  -0.1992 
REGION3  -1.16919  0.69007  0.0902  -0.9082 
CFED  0.0015418  0.0056760  0.7859  0.0012 
MOST  -0.001672  0.0077334  0.8288  -0.0013 
CASHMKT  0.002522  0.0051217  0.6224  0.0020 
HEADMKTD  -0.01055  0.0052170  0.0432  -0.0082 
OPINION1  0.0146  0.09824  0.8819  0.0113 
OPINION2  0.14526  0.08188  0.0761  0.1128 
OPINION3  -0.09457  0.09044  0.2957  -0.0735 
OPINION4  0.13214  0.08350  0.1135  0.1026 
Log of Likelihood = -527.69  Number of Observations = 283   
Right Censored Observations = 5  s = 2.87        





Mandatory price reporting had a rocky start.  The packing industry lobbied 
aggressively against MPR as many producer groups took positions in favor of the policy.  
Technical delays, formidable challenges collecting data, reporting problems, reporting 
errors, confidentiality modifications and other concerns faced the USDA-AMS in 
implementation of MPR.  Challenges early on were so problematic that some early 
supporters were calling for abolishment and return to the old voluntary system shortly 
after its inception.  However, this was not considered feasible nor probable given the 
substantial institutional changes and investment the AMS and beef packers underwent to 
comply with the policy.  
Approximately one year after its inception, technical problems appear to have been 
worked out and confidentiality concerns with infrequent reporting appear to have been 
resolved.  However, results of our survey of cattle feeders located primarily in Iowa, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas indicate overall a lack of producer satisfaction with what 
MPR has been able to accomplish.  However, it is also important to note that a wide 
range of opinions regarding the value of MPR to cattle feeders is apparent.  Suffice it to 
say, a consensus opinion regarding whether mandatory reporting has benefited the beef 
industry or whether it has increased price information is not apparent from our survey 
responses.  The modal response to these two queries was a 5, or indifferent.  However, a 
strong majority of cattle feeder survey respondents indicate MPR has not enhanced cattle 
feeder negotiation with beef packers.  Interestingly, feedlot characteristics are generally 
not systematically related to feedlot manager opinions regarding MPR.  Therefore, as 
revisions are considered to MPR, it does not appear that targeting revisions to cater to 
needs of any particular feedlot size, location, or feedlots using particular marketing 
















Figure 3.  Frequency Distribution for “Mandatory Price Reporting is Benefiting the Beef 
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Figure 4.  Frequency Distribution for Average of Response to “Information on 
Regional/National Daily Fed Cattle Cash Prices, Base Prices Used in Grid Pricing, 
Premiums/Discounts Used in Grid Pricing, Boxed Beef Prices has Increased”  (1= 
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Figure 5.  Frequency Distribution for Average of Response to “MPR has Enhanced My 
Ability to Negotiate Cash Prices, Base Prices or Formulas, Grid Premiums/Discounts 
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